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Emerging economies are likely to be more volatile and asset risk more correlated than in 
industrialized countries. In this paper we discuss how credit scoring techniques and modern 
credit risk portfolio models can be used to measure credit risk and check Basel II 
calibration for such an environment.  After reviewing the development of credit risk 
portfolio models, to explain our choice in using CreditRisk+, we discuss the definition and 
estimation methodology for a set of essential parameter inputs, which in turn depend on the 
data available - in this case from the Argentine public credit bureau. We then simulate, 
bank by bank, the introduction of Basel II's foundation IRB approach using the same data 
for Argentina and compare the results. We analyze how the IRB approach might be 
recalibrated and finally discuss a set of other issues regarding IRB implementation in an 
emerging economy. 
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The 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I) has been widely recognized as a significant advance in 
establishing an internationally recognized language to analyze and compare capital across 
different jurisdictions (summarized in the concept of assets at risk) and in attempting to 
establish a level playing field for international bank competition.  Indeed, Basel I was so 
successful as a financial standard that is has been explicitly adopted in more than 100 
countries and, in many jurisdictions, applied not only to 'internationally active banks' but 
rather, to all banks.  At the same time, Basel I has come under increasing criticism, 
especially for the very broad definitions of asset classes and corresponding risk weights that 
lie behind the measurement of 'assets at risk' coupled with the lack of any portfolio 
dimension. As banks' own models of credit risk measurement have become more 
sophisticated, this has driven a wedge between the concepts of 'regulatory' and 'economic' 
capital.  The regulatory response to this growing wedge has been the set of new proposals 
embodied in Basel II that attempts to bring regulatory capital closer to the banks' own 
measurement of economic capital. 
 
Basel II retains the focus on "internationally active banks" and yet in the majority of the 
100 or so countries that have actually implemented Basel I, the action is elsewhere.  In the 
majority of these countries, the universe of rated claims is highly restricted, limiting the 
relevance of the standardized approach.  On the other hand, the IRB approaches as they 
stand appear complex for many emerging economy regulators to consider implementing.  
And yet at the same time, many emerging countries have developed interesting policies 
with respect to information systems on credit risk.  Indeed, perhaps given the history of 
severe banking crises sparked by problems of related lending, some have gone much further 
in collecting finer information on financial system claims than their G10 counterparts.   
These public credit registries (PCR's) are typically now used to set and monitor countries' 
provisioning rules and to monitor related lending.  One view that has gained ground is that 
provisioning should cover expected losses whereas capital should cover unexpected losses, 
but more fundamentally that the sum of provisions and capital should cover the sum of 
expected and unexpected loss.  If PCR's are then helpful to set and monitor provisions it is 
a relatively small step to consider that they may also be useful to set and monitor capital.   
 
This paper then attempts to show how a PCR, in this case from Argentina, can help to set 
capital and provisioning rules.  In order to do this, we employ an econometric credit scoring 
model on the PCR data - an ordered probit - and we use a recently developed "off the shelf" 
credit risk portfolio model - CreditRisk+.  Section 2 provides a review of the development 
in credit risk measurement, with emerging countries in mind, to motivate this modeling 
choice. We then provide a description of the Argentine PCR (section 3) and discuss some 
of the issues in applying CreditRisk+ to Argentine data (section 4).  We then turn our 
attention to Basel II and show how the PCR and the credit-scoring model can be used to 
simulate the effect of the Basel II IRB approach as currently proposed.  We compare our 
IRB simulation with our CreditRisk+ estimates of provisioning and capital requirements 
(section 5).  We discuss how the IRB approach might be recalibrated to "fit" the local data   3
(section 6).  In section 7 we then discuss the regulatory choices faced by an emerging 
country regulator given the Basel II proposals and section 8 concludes. 
 
Naturally, given this study covers historical data and not current Argentine data it is of 
interest as an exploration into the methodology of the use of PCR data to calibrate the IRB 
approach using an off the shelf portfolio model of credit risk rather than how to set capital 
requirements in Argentina today.  Moreover as the case study is a country hopefully 
emerging from a financial crisis, some words of caution are particularly in order regarding 
the use of VAR type models to analyze the total risks of banking systems.  The focus here 
is credit risk. We do not take into account the risk inherent in large public sector bond 
holdings of banks as the Government neared default, nor the risk of devaluation and its 
effect on credit risk nor the risk of “asymmetric pesification” and subsequent compensation 
with Government bonds.  These risks are “outside the model” which only serves to 
underline the view that the sorts of models used here should be thought of as just one 
element in estimating total bank risk and other techniques should be used to complement 
the estimates found by employing these technical models. 
 
Section 2: Evolution of Credit Risk Models and Tools 
 
In this section, we present a brief review of some of the developments in credit risk 
measurement and then discuss how these might be relevant in the context of an emerging 
economy given the type of data frequently available.  In particular emerging countries are 
frequently characterized by (i) a lack of rated and a lack of stock-market quoted claims  
(ii) some but frequently under-developed private credit bureau services and   
(iii) the existence of public credit registries covering a large number of claims but with 
limited information on loan instruments and debtors.  In the review in this section we then 
consider the costs and benefits of each methodology in light of these characteristics. 
 
In the US in March 1991, a major innovation towards the more technical and accurate 
measurement of credit risk was the launch by KMV of the Credit Monitor.  This model 
essentially tracked default probabilities for companies with trading equities and was 
subsequently further enhanced by the 1993 launch of Portfolio Manager by the same 
company that was the first commercially available credit risk portfolio model.  While the 
KMV style methodology may be of substantial interest to the larger (quoted) corporate 
equities in more sophisticated emerging economies, given the use of the volatility of the 
quoted stock as an important input to the model, the characteristics of typical emerging 
country bank portfolios is likely to render this kind of approach to be of limited 
applicability in thinking about regulatory capital in emerging economies more generally. 
 
It should also be noted that over the period 1992-1997 there was a substantial development 
in market-traded instruments that contain pertinent information regarding companies' 
default risks.  The OTC credit derivative markets started to grow substantially and reached 
some $4-5bn of notional value trades by 1993.  However, while a relatively liquid market 
in credit derivatives for some emerging market sovereigns developed, again the number of 
emerging market corporates with liquid credit derivatives is very thin on the ground and 
once again restricted to the larger corporates in the more sophisticated emerging 
economies.   4
 
A second significant development in commercially available credit risk modeling was the 
1997 launch of CreditMetrics by JP Morgan, subsequently developed by JP Morgan 
affiliate RiskMetrics.  CreditMetrics is known as a marked-to-market credit-risk model and 
essentially links a set of ratings to bond prices and uses a matrix of transition probabilities 
on those ratings to calculate the probability distribution of future bond prices and hence a 
description of credit risk.  Credit risk is then the risk of financial loss due to an increase in 
spread (fall in bond price) as a result of a "downgrade" in rating.  This implies that to make 
the model operative a reasonably good idea of the credit yield curve is required plus 
reasonable estimates of the transition probabilities and correlations. 
 
While there are several tricks that can be applied to lessen the actual number of data 
estimates required, the data requirements to make CreditMetrics operative are formidable.
2  
In the context of an emerging economy with, in general, a lack of liquid corporate bond 
markets (at any maturity), while the credit yield curve can be estimated using the sovereign 
yield curve, and guesswork guided by common sense, it will remain at best something of a 
guess.  Moreover, without a large number of rated claims, at first sight the model may not 
appear very applicable to an emerging economy context. However, the ratings in 
CreditMetrics can be thought of not as external ratings but, say, the internal ratings of a 
Superintendency and the traded bonds then become loans. This then implies the need to 
link the internal ratings system of the Superintendency with the credit yield curve and also 
requires a reasonable history of those internal ratings (with consistent rules over time) to 
estimate the transition probabilities
3. 
 
In 1997, Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP - an affiliate of Credit Suisse First Boston, 
CSFB) launched a rival to CreditMetrics known as CreditRisk+. In contrast to 
CreditMetrics, which is normally available on commercial terms through RiskMetrics, 
CreditRisk+ is "available" for free and appears to be used by CSFB more as a marketing 
tool for other business than an independent commercial activity.
4 CreditRisk+ differs in 
concept to CreditMetrics as it is not a marked-to-market model but normally referred to as 
an "actuarial model" where the actuarial "event" modeled is a default - sometimes defined 
more widely as a "credit risk event." Unlike CreditMetrics that then considers financial 
losses due to an increase in credit risk (a downgrade) before default, CreditRisk+ only 
considers the credit risk inherent in default or the defined credit risk event.
5 
 
                                                 
2 In general these tricks refer to 'standard values' where estimates are sometimes not available and regulatory 
rules on the matrix of transition probabilities to ensure stationarity. 
3 Creditmetrics was also programmed to work on the Argentine Central Bank database. 
4 Available is placed in commas as while the codes are available on the world wide web, it requires a certain 
level of user-skill and a considerable investment in time to become familiar with the model and the codes to 
program it to a particular application. 
5 Of course a downgrade in itself is a credit risk event so the difference is really in that Creditmetrics uses a 
marked to market methodology to calibrate financial loss given a downgrade (and the model normally 
includes the possibility of several downgrades) whereas Creditrisk+ incorporates only one credit risk event 
(default) and employs assumptions about the loss given default when default occurs.  Increasingly, however, 
the similarity of the two models has been stressed in the literature rather than the differences – see especially 
Gordy (2000) and Crouchy and Robert (1999).   5
CreditRisk+ is then somewhat simpler than CreditMetrics across several dimensions 
although the cost of this simpler approach is that the output may be more restrictive.  In 
general the model is more appropriate for the estimation of risk than for pricing - although 
of course from the risk estimation, some information on pricing can be gleaned.  One of the 
most significant advantages of CreditRisk+ is that there is an analytical solution to the 
model that makes computation much simpler.  Moreover, the data requirements are 
certainly less arduous than CreditMetrics and arguably more suitable to the context of 
estimating appropriate capital and provisioning in the context of an emerging country, 
however, that does not mean that the data requirements are straightforward! 
 
A critical variable in the model is the loan default rate, which is stochastic and assumed to 
have a gamma distribution.  The general model has several sectors such that each sector has 
an independent distribution of default rates but where within each sector loan default rates 
are perfectly correlated. The model is set-up such that if the user wishes, loans can be 
related to a small number of orthogonal (fundamental) factors that drive credit risk. In 
effect each loan can be sub-divided into those factors (sectors) with the percentage of each 
loan in each sector given by the sensitivity of the loan to each fundamental risk-driver 
(factor).  The multi-sector version can then be quite complex and CSFP reports that under 
most circumstances a one-sector model provides good first order approximations to two and 
three sector versions.  In the context of an emerging economy, it is likely that 'systemic' risk 
is high such that a one-sector model, which is also the most conservative approach, 
provides an even better approximation than perhaps within the context of a larger G10 
economy. 
 
In what follows, we consider the one sector version of CreditRisk+.   The critical data input 
required is then the mean default rate for each loan and the variance of that default rate.  
The covariances between loans are then determined by the distributional assumptions.  The 
default rate is typically estimated using an econometric model and a sample of actual 
defaults (or credit events) and information on the loan instrument and the borrower as 
explanatory variables. The variance of the default risk is a critical variable and 
unfortunately one that is quite difficult to estimate.  Several rules of thumb are available for 
how to fix this variable (normally expressed as a percentage of the mean default rate) and 
estimates are available from published studies in the US and elsewhere.  In the context of 
an emerging economy with a reasonable time-period of data on internal ratings or "credit 
risk" events an estimate of the variance of the default rate can also be obtained from a 
calculated transition probability matrix
6. 
 
A second vital dimension of required data is the loss given the default (or credit event).  To 
a large extent the loss given the event depends on the precise definition of the event.  If the 
event is really default, then losses for creditors, even with guarantees, are likely to be a very 
high proportion of the claim whereas if the event is defined as say the loan entering into a 
Superintendency's worst internal rating, frequently labeled "non-recoverable", then despite 
the name, some recovery is normally expected.  The loss given the event will depend 
largely on the proportion of the loan guarantees and the quality of the guarantee, which in 
                                                 
6 An advantage of a credit registry with a standardized system of credit ratings is the better estimation of 
transition probabilities and hence of this crucial parameter.   6
turn will depend on the legal environment of the country.  As in Basel II, the estimation of 
this recovery rate (the opposite of the loss) is a further critical input for establishing the 
credit risk being taken. 
 
Considering the data available in a typical emerging economy with only a small universe of 
quoted stocks and a small number of traded corporate debt instruments, but with some 
information on default (or credit risk event) patterns, it appears that an actuarial style model 
may be more appropriate than either the KMV financial-option or the CreditMetrics marked 
to market approach considering current commercially available models. However, as noted, 
even the application of an actuarial based model such as CreditRisk+, is not without its 
problems.  In what follows we review the data available to the Argentine regulators and 
discuss how the various methodological problems were confronted with the application of 
Creditrisk+. 
 
Section 3: A brief description of the Argentine Public Credit Information 
 
For the analyses to follow, we used data from the “Central de Deudores” database, which is 
managed by the Central Bank of Argentina.  The database contains monthly information on 
all debtors with a total debt larger than $50.  The data we used spanned 1988 to 2000, and 
include around 6 million debtors per month. 
 
For each debtor, the information included the balance of the debt, the value of the collateral 
or guarantee and the bank’s rating of the debt according to the standardized rating 
procedures.  The rating is a number between 1 and 5
7 that represents the history of the debt 
and an evaluation of the debtor’s ability to pay in the future. The five ratings have the 
definitions as given in Table 1. 
 




2 Potential  Risk 
3 With  Problems 
4  High Insolvency Risk 
5 Irrecoverable 
 
Financial institutions calculated the rating differently for commercial and consumer loans.  
For commercial loans the rating depended on a cash flow analysis, and for consumer loans 
the rating depended on the history of payment.  Loans that are greater than $200,000 were 
automatically treated as commercial loans, whereas loans that are less than $200,000 were 
treated as consumer loans.  Financial institutions could choose to treat loans under 
$200,000 to corporations as either consumer or commercial loans. 
                                                 
7 A new rating “6” was subsequently added and include the non-performing loans of liquidated banks.  We 
treat loans in Situation 6 as if they were in Situation 5.  These loans constitute only a very small percentage of 
the loans in Situations 5 and 6 and the difference for our purposes is not particularly important.   7
 
As discussed above, to apply Creditrisk+ requires a definition of “default” of the “credit 
risk event”.  We will define a loan entering into Situation 5 as having defaulted.  Thus the 
probability of default is equal to the probability of ending in situation 5
8. 
 
Section 4: Methodological Issues applying CreditRisk+ to Argentine Data 
 
A number of steps are required to apply Creditrisk+ to any particular application.  Here we 
consider 6 steps and discuss the different decisions that can be taken and the pros and cons 
of each. 
 
1.  Choose an appropriate time horizon to consider “default”. 
 
The time horizon is a fundamental choice and refers most fundamentally to the time 
horizon that regulators have in mind when they set capital requirements discussed in 
detail in the Basel documents.  In other words, the time horizon to be used in the 
modeling exercise should be the same as the time horizon regulators have in mind, 
which is perhaps the time required for the owners of a bank to reconstitute capital in the 
case of a deficiency.  Basel II has advocated the use of essentially one-year default 
probabilities and that is the typical standard used.  This implies that capital and 
provisions will be set according to some Value at Risk style formula considering a one-
year time horizon.  Naturally if a longer time horizon is chosen it is likely that default 
probabilities and required capital will rise.   
 
2.  Choose the number of sectors and allocate the loans to the different sectors 
 
Creditrisk+ is set up to consider different fundamental risk drivers, factors or sectors 
with individual loans being sensitive in different proportions to each.  As discussed 
above, given the importance of systemic risk, we believe that a reasonable starting point 
for emerging economies is a one-sector model.  This is in fact the most conservative 
assumption as it implies that mean default probabilities are all perfectly correlated.
9  In 
other words this assumption will in general result in higher required capital levels.  An 
alternative would be to say define 2 sectors.  One possibility would be to define two 
orthogonal factors to represent internal and external events (roughly corresponding to 
traded and non-traded sectors).  Percentages of each loan could then be assigned to each 
factor.  We stress that these factors would have to be orthogonal i.e.: the risk driver in 
the “traded” sector that is independent of the local or “non traded” risk driver.  Whether 
this would result in very different required capital requirements for loans in each sector 
would of course be an empirical matter.  And overall this would tend to result in a lower 
capital cushion.  It would of course also complicate considerably the data requirements 
and the calculations. 
 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed description see Balzarotti, Falkenheim and Powell (2002). 
9 We stress that this does not mean that all loans will default at the same time.  Default probabilities are 
stochastic variables with standard deviations with assumed gamma distributions.  In fact the inputted mean 
and standard deviation of default probabilities determines the correlation structure.   8
3.  For each loan obtain the exposure and the loss given default. 
 
In the case of Argentina loan exposures are available from the “Central de Deudores”.  
Basel II discusses in some detail assumptions regarding exposure at default and this is a 
reasonably complex issue especially for credit lines or other forms of contingent 
commitments. The “Central de Deudores” uses actual loans outstanding plus loan 
commitments and we simply follow those definitions in the analysis to follow. An 
alternative would be to make assumptions regarding the use of contingent lines but this 
would require reasonably precise detail on the type of credit which typically a public 
credit registry does not have.  The value added of including such data in a standard PCR 
is an interesting point worth discussing further. 
 
The loss given default is a critical parameter of any analysis of credit risk.  In the case 
of emerging countries, recovery rates on loans tend to be very low indeed although also 
there are few good studies aimed at estimating such variables.  Typically, if the loan is 
unsecured recovery rates are close to zero.  If they have collateral a percentage of the 
value of the collateral well below 100% (net of legal and administration costs), is likely 
to be recovered.  The loss given default also depends on the definition of default.  In the 
analysis below, we assume that recovery rates are 50% of the guarantees.
10  Overall we 
believe this is a reasonable assumption perhaps erring somewhat on the conservative 
side. In Creditrisk+ it turns out that required capital is a linear function of this 
parameter.  Hence if say a 75% figure is preferred the results can simply be multiplied 
by the (75/50)*(% guarantee) to obtain the new implied requirement. 
 
4.  Estimate the mean probability of default 
 
Default probabilities can be obtained by a variety of approaches in the spectrum of 
subjective to objective measures.  Basel II argues in favor of more objective measures 
essentially founded in econometric scoring type models.  Increasingly, for new clients, 
banks are moving towards more objective scoring techniques often based on a scorecard 
of particularly important variables with weights determined by an underlying 
econometric scoring modeling exercise.   For existing clients banks tend to have of 
course much more powerful information including the detailed use of clients’ accounts.  
This underlines the significant trade-offs involved in the use of internal models and a 
more centralized system as discussed further in section 6.   
 
Here, we employ a credit-scoring model based on the information available in the 
Central de Deudores.  This has significant advantages in that information across the 
banking system can be used in the estimation and that the regulator can check more 
easily banks’ own default probability estimations.  It has the disadvantage that more 
subtle information available to the bank on its own clients is not incorporated in the 
model. 
 
                                                 
10 This pessimistic recovery rate figure came from conversations with leading banks in Argentina and the 
assumption is consistent with Argentina’s system of minimum loan allowances, which requires half as much 
previsions for fully collateralized loans as it does for loans without collateral.   9
In a companion paper in this project, we discuss how the quality of these models vary 
depending on the precise information available. One very important variable is typically 
the borrower’s history.  This turns out to be very significant.  This underlines the 
importance of maintaining positive as well as negative data otherwise this variable may 
not be available or may lose its power. 
 
In the case of the Argentine database there is very little information available regarding 
the borrower but more information regarding the type of loan.  More recently, more 
information was collected on borrowers (5 fields for consumers and 13 for commercial 
credit).  However, the quality of this information has been somewhat questionable.  
Again, this speaks to some of the tradeoffs involved in the design of PCR’s for different 
purposes.  A database of 6+ million entries per month is a cumbersome beast and 
adding even 2 or 3 new fields implies a significant increase in the data to be managed 
and obviously makes checking the quality of the information difficult to say the least.  It 
should be noted however that the credit scoring model that we estimate below appears 
to work reasonably well despite the very small number of fields used to estimate the 
default probabilities.  The model is included in Appendix 1. 
 
5.   Estimating the standard deviation of the probability of default 
 
In applying CreditRisk+, the standard deviation of the default rates is a crucial 
parameter of the model.  There are at least three possibilities for estimating these 
standard deviations: 
 
 a.  The credit scoring model that estimates the default probabilities also generates a 
number of statistics that might be used to estimate average default rates and the 
distribution of their sample estimates].  However, this is a little complicated as the 
model estimates a credit score and it is not entirely obvious how the standard deviation 
of the “equation” of a score then translates into the standard deviation of a default 
probability.  However, one natural possibility is to use the standard deviation of the 
constant in the regression. In the appendix this can be seen as about 50%.  The 
drawback of this approach however is that the standard deviation estimated is 
essentially one of cross-section rather than over time as we employ only one year of 
data.  It is not obvious that this is the right standard deviation applicable to CreditRisk+.  
However, if more data had been available over time, this would certainly be one 
possibility. 
 
 b.    A transition probability matrix can also be used to estimate the standard 
deviation of the transition probabilities and as we have used entering into the Situation 
5 as our definition of default, the standard deviation of the relevant transition 
probability is indeed analogous to the standard deviation of the default rate that we 
need.  The estimation of such standard deviations is explained in Nickell, Perraudin and 
Varotto (1998).  On the Argentine data this gives something of the order of 27%. 
 
 c.  International estimates of default probability standard deviations are also 
available.  However, such estimates typically come from US, and other G7 bond data 
and hence apply to rated corporates – in general the wrong sample from the standpoint   10
of an emerging economy regulator.  This literature contains estimates ranging from 
below 50% to over 100%.  
 
d. The CreditRisk+ Technical Manual contains advice for the user on how to fix this 
parameter and it is recommended as fixed as a linear function of the default 
probabilities estimated. 
 
Given the fundamental importance of this variable for what follows, it is of course 
crucial to conduct some kind of sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to 
different assumptions.  In what follows, we employ assumptions of the default 
probabilities spanning what we believe as reasonable to conservative estimates for this 
variable for Argentina.  As can be seen below, the results are indeed sensitive to this 
assumption. 
 
6.   Use the CreditRisk+ algorithm to calculate the loss distribution. 
 
The CreditRisk+ technical documents available on the internet provide the relevant 
algorithms to estimate the loss distribution for any portfolio given the other data as 
described above.  This requires some programming skill and the code can be written in 
Visual Basic or another preferred language.  The size of the portfolio, and secondly the 
skill of the programmer, will to a large extent determine the size and the speed of the 
hardware necessary to run the model in a reasonable time period.  Again a significant 
advantage of CreditRisk+ is the relative ease of computation against some of its 
competitors.  However, although it does not require Monte Carlo simulations to obtain 
the loss distributions, the recursive nature of the algorithm can eat up computer time 
fairly rapidly. The Argentine database is fairly large with some 6+ million entries.  On a 
Pentium II desktop the program tended to need four hours or so to run.  Below we then 
summarize the main assumptions used to make CreditRisk+ operational on the 
Argentine data: 
 
1.  The loan data are obtained from the Central de Deudores. 
2.  The exposure is amount of debt outstanding plus loan commitments. 
3.  Default is defined as Category 5 of the Central de Duedores. 
4.  Recovery given default = 50% of any collateral. 
5.  The default Probability is the probability of entering category 5 in a one year 
period, estimated using an ordered Probit ‘scoring’ model 
6.  The loss distribution is estimated using the CreditRisk+ algorithm with one 
sector. 
 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the results of this kind of estimation using Argentine data by 
graphing the probability loss distribution curves of the top 5 private banks (aggregated) 
in the Argentine system for different values of the volatility of the default probability 
(we use 0.3 and 0.5 times the default probability as we think that this is a reasonable 
range). Also Table 2 compares the CR+ estimated requirements (using a 99.9%   11
percentile confidence limit) with the actual requirements and the actual levels of capital 




Table 2. Model Output versus Current Capital Requirements versus Actual Capital 
 
                                                 
11 These figures are taken from Balzarotti, Falkenheim and Powell (2003). 
Sigma = 0.3 Mu Sigma = 0.5 Mu
Provisioning 2,965,281 2,963,521
Capital 3,509,151 6,677,422
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Figure 1: Probability of Loss Distribution for the Credit Portfolio of the  
Five Largest Argentine Private Banks (Using 99.9% Tolerance Values)   12
 
The results are interesting for a number of reasons.  First, the graph shows the 
sensitivity of the CR+ estimated requirements to the volatility parameter.  Identifying 
provisions with expected loss and capital with unanticipated loss, the graph also makes 
clear that increasing the volatility of default affects much more the unanticipated loss 
subject to some percentile value (we take 99.9%) than the expected loss.  Comparing 
the values of the results of the CR+ estimation with the actual requirements it can be 
noted that with the volatility parameter set at 30% of the default probabilities the 
aggregate charge (capital and provisions) in Argentina appeared adequate but that with 
this parameter at 50% the requirements were deficient.  The Table also gives actual 
capital and provisioning levels that were significantly higher than the requirements. Of 
course this analysis is based on a rather short history of debtor behavior and cannot 
possibly capture subsequent events in Argentina that included Government default and 
a maxi devaluation with “asymmetric pessification”.  This experience illustrates that the 
usual caveats associated with the use of VAR models are very important to bear in mind 
especially ion the context of countries subject to large, hopefully low probability, 
events. 
 
Section 5: Simulating Basel II IRB on Argentine Data
12 
   
In this section we use the same credit-scoring model to simulate banks’ internal ratings and 
hence simulate an IRB Basel II approach using the Argentine data.  Our purpose is to then 
be able to compare the results of CreditRisk+ and the simulated IRB approach using the 
same estimates from the scoring model to be able to consider the Basel II calibration of the 
IRB approach for a country such as Argentina.  Again there are a number of steps required 
to implement the IRB approach as expounded in the BASEL documents. 
 
We divide the portfolio of banks into corporate (loans > $200,000) and retail   
(loans < $200,000).  For the corporate portfolio we employ the following steps: 
 
1.  Loan data from Central de Deudores 
2.  Exposure at Default (EAD) =amount of debt outstanding 
3.  Recovery Rate=50% of any guarantees and Loss Given Default (LGD) for each 
loan is then 100% -50%*Guarantees. 
4.  Probability of default from Scoring Model 
5.  We calculate the correlation coefficient, R, using the formula provided in the 
October 2002, “Quantitative Impact Study 3. technical Guidance”, Foundational 
IRB Approach. 
6.  We use the Basel II, October 2002 curve, from “Quantitative Impact Study 3. 
technical Guidance”, Foundational IRB Approach. 
                                                 
12 Here we consider only the Basel II IRB Foundation approach.  The advanced IRB approach, which allows 
banks to also estimate loss given default and other parameters, is not considered.   13
7.  We use a maturity of 2 years for corporate loans (this is our estimate of the 
average maturity of corporate lending in Argentina at the time) and we employ 
the maturity adjustment formula as indicated. 
8.  We calculate the Capital Requirement, K, as a function of the correlation 
coefficient, R, the probability of default, PD and the Loss Given Default (LGD) 
using the formula provided. 
9.  We calculate the “IRB assets at risk” as K*12.5*EAD. 
10. Calculation of the total capital charge as 8% of the "IRB assets at risk". 
11. We conducted the analysis with no adjustment fro lending to small and medium 
sized enterprises and then with the adjustment as specified in the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision, Consultative Paper 3. 
 
For the retail portfolio, we use the approach suggested in “other retail loans” and the 
relevant formulae as the information in the credit bureau did not at that time specify well 
the types of loans (mortgages versus other loans). 
 
Section 6: Analysis of the results and re-calibrating the IRB. 
 
In this section we discuss the results and compare the required capital and provisions 
following CreditRisk+, and the required capital and provisions following the simulation of 
the Basel II IRB approach.  We conduct this analysis for the 18 largest private Argentine 
banks using historical (2000) data.  Again we consider different values of the volatility 
parameter in CR+ to compare the CR+ results with the IRB simulations. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the simulated IRB requirements against the CR+ calculated 
requirements for the 18 largest private banks in the Argentine system using this historical 
data.  Each point in this graph represents a bank and each point then represents a 
comparison of the required capital and provisioning (expected and unexpected loss) 
estimated using the two different techniques (IRB and CR+).  The X axis always refers to 
the simulated IRB requirements and the two sets of points refer to CR+ estimates for 
volatility assumptions of 20% and 50% of the default probabilities.  We explain below why 
we choose these particular values.   14
 




The graph illustrates how the CR+ estimated requirements shift up with higher default rate 
volatility assumptions. We choose 20% of the default rate for one value of the CR+ volatility 
parameter as can be seen from the graph it turns out that the new IRB curve appears a close fit to 
the CR+ estimates given a volatility assumption of 20% of the default probabilities.  This is 
confirmed by a regression across these 18 banks of the CR+ estimates (with 20% volatility) 
against the IRB "assets at risk" (with the constant set to zero), which yields a coefficient not 
significantly different from 8% - the IRB requirement as a percentage of the "IRB assets at risk".  
The regression results are reported in the appendix 2.  It should also be noted that the R-squared 
of the regression is extremely high - we note however that there are problems of interpretation of 
an R squared when there is no constant in the regression.  
 
However, as we have discussed above, estimates of the volatility parameter in CR+ normally 
yield higher estimates than 20%. As illustration we consider a volatility estimate of 50% of the 
default probability and the comparison of the   CR+ estimates against the IRB simulated 
requirements is also graphed in Figure 1.  As can be noted this implies quite different estimates 
to the current IRB calibration, and these differences appear to be larger - at least in peso terms - 
as the size of the requirement increases.  It would appear that if CR+ with a volatility of 50% is 
considered as the "truth", then at least for this historical Argentine data the October IRB curve is 
too flat. 
 
In theory, given the non-linearities involved in modeling credit risk, this results probably calls 
for a whole re-calibration of the entire IRB curve to 'fit' more closely the higher default 
probabilities and higher volatility of default probabilities found in emerging economies.  As most 
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should not be too much of surprise that estimated requirements using CR+ give higher values 
than the current G10 calibrated IRB curve.  In the case of Argentina the minimum requirement 
under Basel I was 11.5%.  In Figure 3, we simply adjust the IRB requirements using 11.5% and 
not 8% and apply this higher figure to the October 2002 IRB curve "assets at risk" and compare 
this to the CR+ estimates with the 50% volatility parameter.
13  This is clearly an improvement 
but it turns out a better 'fit' can be achieved. 
 
  CR+0.5         45 Degree Line 
 
 
Indeed, one methodology is to run a regression between the IRB simulated assets at risk and the 
CR+ estimated requirements with the 50% volatility parameter.  The coefficient of that 
regression then yields the 'best fit' capital requirement percentage to employ to fit the IRB 
requirements to the CR+ calculated requirements for this group of banks. The result was a capital 
requirement of 14.1%.  The result of this regression is reported in appendix 3 and Figure 4 
illustrates the results.  
 
We should note however from the regression results that there is some evidence that the  'fit' is 
not so good than in the case with the IRB using 8% and the CR+ volatility parameter set at 20%.  
This would be a natural finding if, for example, the IRB curve had been calibrated with the 
equivalent of a CR+ 20% volatility assumption. 
 
In summary we have found that the current calibration of the IRB curve fits the Argentine data 
extremely well assuming that the 'truth' is that as represented by the CreditRisk+ model with the 
                                                 
13 In fact the 11.5% for Argentina only really gave a base level for minimum capital requirements.  Various add-on 
features, including a factor that increased “assets at risk” relative to the Basel definition that depended on the interest 
rate charged on each loan (using that rate as a signal of risk), pushed minimum capital requirements to 13-14% of 
assets at risk using Basel I criteria. 
 















volatility parameter set to 20%.  However, estimates for this parameter on Argentine data have 
revealed estimates in the 30-50% range.  If we take the 50% figure then the current calibration of 
the IRB curve appears inadequate.  One rough method that might be used in practice is then to 
use a regression analysis to find a liner transformation of the IRB "assets at risk" essentially 
replacing the 8% requirement with a new and higher requirement.  In the case of the historical 
Argentine data the best fit was found with a requirement of 14.5% of the "IRB assets at risk".  
However, this technique comes at some cost due to the non-linearity of the models.  Further 
analysis is required to consider how important this cost is in practice. 
 
 
CR+0.5         45 Degree Line  
 
Finally, we conducted analysis of the adjustment proposed in Consultative Paper 3 regarding the 
position of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises – SME’s.  This allows for a different 
calculation of the correlation coefficient, R, depending on the annual sales of the company.  A 
reduced correlation may be calculated for companies with annual sales of less than 50 million 
Euros down to a minimum correlation for companies with annual sales of less than 5 million 
Euros.  Unfortunately we do not have data on sales and indeed the only consistent variable linked 
to the size of a company is the overall debt with the financial system.  However, on testing 
different procedures, we find that the SME adjustment has very little effect on the overall results.  
A recent study by the Central Bank suggests that an operational definition of an SME for our 
purpose is a company with debts of less than 2.5 million pesos with the financial system – See 
Escude et al (2001)
14.  Suppose all such companies are given the maximum benefit under the 
BCBS SME adjustment – in other words all companies with debts of less than 2.5 million pesos 
are assumed to have sales of less than 5million Euros.  We then calculate the effect that such an 
                                                 
14 This is the level of debt found to be consistent with the definition of an SME in terms of sales and employment. 
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adjustment would have on the overall capital requirement simulating Basel II IRB Foundation 
for the 20 largest banks in the system.  We find that the maximum effect is a reduction of 3.4% 
in the overall capital requirement and the minimum effect is a reduction of 0.1% of the capital 
requirement across these banks. The average is a reduction of just 1% in the capital requirement.  
We conclude that the SME adjustment will not affect the results outlined above. 
 
Section 7: Regulatory choices for emerging countries under Basel II 
 
According to proposed new Capital Accord, supervisors will have a choice either to implement 
the standardized approach to set capital requirements or to allow their regulated banks to employ 
one of the two internal ratings based approaches.
15  Bearing in mind the difficulties posed by the 
implementation of an IRB approach in an emerging economy, which are reviewed below, it is 
quite likely that many local authorities will choose to remain on Basel I or implement the 
standardized approach. In both cases, much of the effort of the BCBS in revising the 1988 
Accord’s quantitative requirements may have little relevance.  A main difference between Basel 
I and Basel II´s standardized approach is that the latter uses credit ratings but a very small 
number of corporations have ratings in emerging countries.
16  Furthermore, rated corporates are 
typically those with lower risk and greater information available and therefore improving the link 
between capital and risk in this sector would mean very limited progress on the measurement and 
management of the risk stemming from the universe of bank obligors. 
 
Under Basel II, emerging country regulators then face a difficult choice.  They may implement 
the standardized approach in which case little will change or attempt to implement the complex 
IRB even in its simpler foundational form.  Many are also likely to shy away from the IRB as it 
appears to give a high degree of autonomy to regulated institutions to employ their own rating 
scales and their own methodologies to convert the internal ratings into regulatory capital charges.  
At the same time many emerging countries, in contrast to some G10 counterparts,
17 have well 
developed or developing public credit registries that are already being used to set and monitor 
provisioning.
18  As illustrated in this paper these databases are extremely useful tools to assess 
adequate both capital and provisioning levels.
19 
 
We argue that this situation could be improved by focusing more closely on the transition 
process toward and IRB approach and possibly devising some “structured” transition process.  
This “transition” approach would consist of an adaptation of certain definitions and parameters 
                                                 
15 The new Accord is due to be published in the middle of 2004 by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.  
Member countries of the Committee (13 industrialized nations) have made a commitment to implement the new 
Accord.  Non-member countries (the vast majority of countries) that have Adopted Basel I may stay on that 1988 
agreement or may move to the new Accord. 
16 In Argentina the "central de Deudores" had some 80,000 corporates of which less than some 150 had a rating. 
17 Exceptions are France and Italy. 
18 We note that in many emerging countries (Argentina being an exception), capital requirements are set by law and, 
in contrast to the Basel core principals regulators, do not have the flexibility to change capital charges without going 
to congress.  However, this is typically not the case for provisioning.  Hence in countries where capital is set at say 
9% of Basel I assets at risk, regulators may be able to use provisioning to gain flexibility in adjusting total 
requirements (capital plus provisions to asset risks).   These public credit registries are then very important tools in 
this process  (see the companion paper, Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004). 
19 After all as illustrated in Figure 1, whatever the breakdown between provisions and capital the sum of the two 
should cover both anticipated and unanticipated losses.    18
of the IRB approach to better reflect the real risks in an emerging market and to apply all or a 
broad number of financial institutions in the economy.  This approach would attempt to combine 
some of the advantages of the IRB approach (a better link between economic and regulatory 
capital) but it is more standardized than the IRB approach of the new Accord and, importantly, it 
draws on existing policies in emerging economies. 
 
As will be discussed further below, the main advantages of this alternative would be (i) to adapt 
the methodology to turn it into a more accurate instrument to measure risks in an emerging 
economy environment;  (ii) to make it possible for an IRB type methodology to be implemented, 
even at the expense of some loss of individuality and (iii) to facilitate control and validation. 
Adaptation of definitions and parameters 
 
A primary drawback of the application of the Basel II´s IRB approach, in emerging countries is 
that it is calibrated on G10 and not on emerging country data. Portfolio models that are used to 
calibrate the methodology imply that, for sufficiently large and fine-grained portfolios, loss rates 
should be driven by the sensitivity to systemic economic factors of borrowers’ ability to repay 
and by the frequency and severity of systemic events.  Apart from the level of some variables, 
such as sensitivity and loss rates, which are reviewed later, as a practical matter, the conventional 
VaR models embed estimates of the likelihood and severity of systemic events.  In other words, a 
choice of a portfolio loss distribution percentile –one of the key prudential parameters- may be 
interpreted as one minus the estimated bank failure rate in an economic downturn of the 
specified –or implied- severity, if banks hold capital equal to the estimated loss at that percentile. 
The most important systemic events are economic recessions and these in emerging economies, 
needless to say, differ in severity and frequency and sometimes also in nature as compared to the 
systemic events embedded in the models and the parameters deriving from them. 
 
Other basic definitions embedded in the models may also differ in emerging economies.  For 
example, loan maturities are likely to be shorter and loss given default assumptions may have to 
be adapted.  Moreover, credit risk cannot be so easily diversified away in emerging markets as in 
developed economies, even in slightly distressed markets, banks could have little ability to 
manage their loss exposures or to raise additional capital. 
In the same fashion, the actual average level of asset return correlation between loans in an 
emerging economy is likely to be different from that of the sample used to calibrate the model.   
 
The use of centralized rating systems 
 
The probability of default is determined by banks in both the foundation and the advanced 
alternatives of the IRB approach and could be considered as well in the transition process toward 
the IRB approach.  However, in emerging economies there may be advantages if banks rate 
borrowers according to a rating system (scale and criteria) and not just according to principles, 
determined by the regulator.  The rating would then be used to calculate a capital requirement. 
To a significant extent this approach might mirror and build on existing policies already adopted 
by some countries.  Such policies, properly adapted, could also be applied to set minimum 
capital requirements.   19
Coverage (historical window) and applicability of the data 
 
As established by the BCBS, the minimum requirements of the IRB demand the historical period 
for the data employed to be 5 years and that this should be very much seen as a minimum.  
Emerging economies are unlikely to have this data ready by the time of Basel II implementation.  
Again this may call for a more structured transition period towards Basel II.  Besides that 
consideration, it is clear that a centralized set of data in many cases will solve coverage 
problems, as long as (i) the criteria and definitions have been kept invariant during the relevant 
period
20 and (ii) the environment remains mostly unchanged. 
 
However, the regulator could address the problems generated by the lack of data adopting a new 
parametric approach. It might be argued that the losses deriving from a more structured approach 
are more than compensated by the fact that a better treatment of risk could be applied to a much 
broader group of banks.  For example, in the research experience of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, it has become clear that even the largest banks may not have experienced sufficient 
number of defaults and losses from some asset classes to produce reasonably accurate parameter 
estimates.  Furthermore, only few banks have not been involved in institutional transformations 
such as mergers and acquisitions in some emerging economies in the last decade and this trend is 
likely to remain the same in the near future.  In these cases, applicability of historical data to 
forecast potential losses is hampered. Needless to say, parameters and methodologies calibrated 
in a G10 headquarters would not necessarily be appropriate for a subsidiary of an international 
bank in an emerging country. 
  
As we have attempted to illustrate, the data gathered in credit registries may be used to 
compensate for the lack of market risk data in emerging countries.  Data from publicly traded 
corporate bonds is highly limited and reflects, as has already been said, some of the cases with 
the lowest risk, in only a few sectors of the economy.  Therefore, mark-to-market values are 
generally not available for the exposures to which credit risk modeling is applied. 
Validation 
 
The third main advantage of a more standardized IRB approach refers to validation.  The process 
of ensuring that a model is implemented in an appropriate way involves serious difficulties 
related to testing heterogeneous bank models.  This may pose demands for supervisory 
capabilities that may be difficult to meet by emerging market authorities.  In contrast, in order to 
supervise a standard IRB approach, supervisors, especially while conducting on site inspections, 
only need to address internal controls and procedures surrounding the rating process, and focus 
on issues in which they usually have ample experience and skills.  A specialized group within the 
supervision or regulation agencies, might test the model with the degree of rigor that would make 
authorities comfortable.   
 
                                                 
20 We note that in periods of stress there is often a pressure to relax definitions on for example non-performing 
loans.  It is in our view important for the integrity of the data series that these definitions remain constant although 
whether the provisions as a function of that data should be relaxed is another issue.  There has been much discussion 
regarding whether provisions should be made anti-cyclical.   20
Furthermore, the model can be tested examining the accuracy of predictions in a cross-sectional 
sense.  However, this kind of validation should be done with caution since there is a strong 
positive correlation between the, credit standing of different obligors deriving from the strong 
cyclical element in credit risk.  Therefore the time series dimension of validation cannot be 
completely replaced by cross-sectional analysis. 
Provisioning rules 
 
Having reviewed the need to adapt parameters and definitions so as to make them suitable for 
local conditions, there is still another issue to be handled, namely that of provisions and expected 
losses In the case of many Latin American countries, for example, supervisors have much more 
freedom to set provisioning requirements than capital requirements that are frequently fixed 
under law. This has been one of the drivers for an increase in the relative importance of 
provisions in the region relative to capital.  Moreover, in some countries, provisions are 
specifically thought of as covering expected losses.  As the level of provisions in these countries 
exceeds 8%, then there is likely to be some problematic double counting.  The BCBS has now 
addressed this issue and it is expected that the final version of the Accord to be published in mid- 
2004 will allow regulators to deduct constituted provisions from the IRB calculated capital 
requirements. 
 
Section 8: Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have attempted to show how a public credit registry (PCR) can be an extremely 
valuable resource for a bank regulator to set and monitor both regulations for provisions and 
capital. In this application we have taken the case of Argentina, that had a comprehensive PCR, 
and we used that PCR information to (a) estimate a credit scoring model, (b) calculate 
provisioning and capital requirements for banks based on a leading credit risk portfolio model - 
CreditRisk+ (c) simulate a Basel II, IRB approach and (d) consider how that Basel II, IRB 
approach might need to be re-calibrated. 
 
In turn the analysis provokes some questions regarding the new Capital Accord especially for 
emerging economies.  The focus of Basel II has been on internationally active banks and 
therefore it is perhaps not too surprising that the proposals may not fit well the situation of many 
emerging country regulators.  Our feeling is that for many emerging countries, that will wish to 
adhere to the international standard, the relevance of the standardized approach may be limited 
due to the lack of rated claims and yet the IRB approach as written may   
a) be too complex b) give too much autonomy to regulated institutions and c) may not be 
calibrated correctly given the risk-profile of emerging economy claims.  
 
At the same time, many emerging economies have developed PCR's which we have attempted to 
show could be a valuable resource in attempting to set and monitor provisions and capital.  We 
feel that further consideration should be given to the transition process toward a IRB approach 
and in particular to the possibility of defining some “structured” transition process.  Within that 
transition, the local regulator might determine more variables centrally than under the full IRB. 
In particular, a centralized rating scale of a PCR might be employed whereby banks provide their 
own ratings - but where the regulator determines how those ratings feed into default   21
probabilities.  We believe that allowing a structured transition to the IRB along these lines might 
provide a useful way for Basel II to become highly relevant to emerging country regulators and 
allow regulatory capital to more closely reflect economic capital in regions where rated claims 
are highly limited but where a full IRB approach looks still very many years away.   22
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Appendix 1 
 
We estimated the mean probability of default using an Ordered Probit model.  The specification 
of the model is the following: In this equation,  X  represents the vector of explanatory variable, 
() Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution, and β  and γ  are parameters.  β  is the 
vector of coefficients of the explanatory variables, and γ  is the vector cut-offs (between 
situation 1 and 2 for example).  One can see  x β  as the loan’s score in the context of a “Credit 
Scoring” model like the ones used by many commercial lenders.  The larger the score, the lower 
the probability of default. 
We used the following explanatory variables: 
Table 3: Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Description 
INITIAL  Initial rating of the debtor (treated as a categorical variable). 
ACT  Principal Activity of the Debtor (treated as a categorical 
CAMEL  The CAMEL rating of the debtor (treated as a categorical variable). 
COLLATERAL  Collateral as a percentage of the debt. 
LOGBAL  The natural logarithm of the balance. 
LOGBALCUBE
21  The natural logarithm of the balance cubed. 
 
If the ratings provided by financial institutions are indicative of the  probability of default then 
the initial rating of the debt should be significant and the coefficient that corresponds to rating 1 
should be larger than the coefficient that corresponds to rating 2, which in turn should be larger 
than the coefficient that corresponds to rating 3, etc.  The coefficients of the principal activity of 
the debtor should have different values if loans in different industries have different probabilities 
of default.  All else equal we might expect the loans of different institutions to have different 
probabilities of default if some institutions are more competent than others in screening debtors.  
For this reason we included the CAMEL rating – a rating given by supervisors based on the 
Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity criteria – as a variable.  The best financial 
institutions according to this criteria receive a rating of 1 and the worst a 5.  Like with the initial 
rating of the debtor we would expect that the coefficient corresponding to rating 1 should be 
higher than the coefficient corresponding to rating 2 etc.  We include the collateral of the loan as 
a measure of the willingness to pay of debtors.  They are likely to be more careful about paying 
if they stand to lose their collateral in the case of a default.  We suspected that the loan’s balance 
might have a complex relationship with its probability of default.  On the one hand, the recent 
recession has generated financial problems for Argentina’s small and medium sized enterprises.  
Thus we expect that a high probability of default be associated with intermediate levels of debt.  
However, we know that financial institutions screen large exposures more carefully than the 
screen small exposures.  This suggests that low probabilities of default would be associated with 
the largest debts.  Thus, the relation between loan balance and the probability of default is 
probably non-linear.  For this reason, we estimated various specifications of the loan balance and 
in the end decided to use the specification with the natural log of the balance and its cube. 
 
                                                 
21 The quadratic term was found not to be significant in a separate regression.   24
While our data allow us to estimate the mean probability of default fairly well we do not have a 
long enough stretch of data to properly estimate the standard deviation.
22  Instead of estimating 
the standard deviation of the default probability, we assumed that it was a fixed percentage of the 
mean of the distribution, as suggested by CreditRisk+’s technical document.
23  A simulation 
experiment suggested that the standard deviation is typically 27% of the mean.  We will estimate 




The following are the parameters of the ordered probit: 
 
   Coefficient
Standard 
Error t  Probability
Intercept -3.5928623 0.055309 4219.76  0.0001 
        
Initial Rating         
1 5.6537  0.047544 9999.9  0.0001 
2 4.2612  0.047645 7999.04  0.0001 
3 3.6617  0.047781 5873.11  0.0001 
4 3.0149  0.047779 3981.87  0.0001 
5 2.1466  0.047461 2045.78  0.0001 
Principal Activity             
Agricultural Cultivation and Services  0.244  0.004  3421.861  0.0001 
Animal rearing and related services 
(except veterinary services)   0.209  0.005  1747.033  0.0001 
Hunting and Capture of Live Animals  0.029  0.061  0.219933  0.6391 
Fishing and Related Services  0.013  0.072  0.034379  0.8529 
Mining and Exploration  0.12  0.051  5.555528  0.0184 
Foods and Beverages  0.039  0.017  5.103405  0.0239 
Manufacture of textiles, furs, and 
leathers 0.046  0.018  6.749645  0.0094 
Manufacture of substances and 
chemical products  0.392 0.028  194.598 0.0001 
Equipment manufacturing  0.175  0.02  78.01131  0.0001 
Manufacture of vehicles and trailers  0.221  0.029  59.18267  0.0001 
Other manufacturing  0.531  0.006  7572.087  0.0001 
Electricity, Gas, and Steam  0.29  0.065  19.77612  0.0001 
Water capture, purification, and 
distillation -0.024  0.06  0.160083  0.6891 
Construction 0.074  0.019  15.90827  0.0001 
Automobile Sale and Maintenance  0.447  0.019  578.5477  0.0001 
                                                 
22 In a previous attempt, we estimated the standard deviation using a resampling technique.  This method was found 
to have drawbacks.  In particular it depended on the Markov assumption – that’s a loan’s rating in the next period is 
a function only of the rating in the current period.  This not valid in the context of our data and thus the results of the 
previous estimation were biased 
23 See CDSF (1997) page 44.   25
   Coefficient
Standard 
Error t  Probability
Retail sales (except autos)  0.032  0.005  40.78756  0.0001 
Hotels and Restaurants  0.033  0.039  0.713932  0.3981 
Transportation Storage, and 
Communications. 0.443  0.014  1014.184  0.0001 
Financial Intermediation and Other 
Financial Services  0.597  0.034  304.7059  0.0001 
Business and Rental Real Estate  0.305  0.064  22.8333  0.0001 
Public Administration, Defense, and 
Social Security  -0.073  0.011  46.26536  0.0001 
Education, health, and social work  0.256  0.013  360.4226  0.0001 
Other Services  0.111  0.004  994.322  0.0001 





Error t  Probability
1 -0.6384963 0.028  505.7021  0.0001 
2 -1.0022493 0.028  1252.844  0.0001 
3 -0.9053715 0.028  1020.934  0.0001 
4 -1.1689842 0.029  1678.648  0.0001 
5  0  0       
 
   Coefficient
Standard 
Error t  Probability
LOGBAL -0.018  0.000885 430.165  0.0001 
LOGBALCUBE 1.37E-04 0.000037 13.30655  0.0003 
COLLATERAL 0.072  0.003739 371.1363  0.0001 
 
2 γ 0.315 0.00079 
3 γ 0.510 0.001037
4 γ 0.937 0.00157 
5 γ 4.443 0.009453
 
Remembering that larger coefficients represent lower default probabilities, we can see significant 
differences between different activities.  “Financial Intermediation and Other Financial 
Services.”, for example, has a much larger coefficient than “Water capture, purification, and 
distillation.”  The CAMEL rating is also significant but not always in the way that we would 
expect.  Financial institutions with a CAMEL equal to 1 seem to have less risky loans than  
CAMEL 2, 3, y 4.  However the coefficient of CAMEL 5 is the highest of all, even though 5 
represents the worst classification.  This is probably because only one bank had a CAMEL equal 
to 5 in the moment of estimation.  Also we did not expect the coefficient of CAMEL 2 to be   26
lower than that of CAMEL 3.  Probably in the future it will be best to estimate the model with 
three groups defined by the CAMEL rating:  CAMEL = 1, CAMEL = 2 or 3, and CAMEL = 4  
or 5. 
 
The parameters LOGBAL and LOGBALCUBE show that the balance has a non-monotonic 
relationship with credit risk with a maximum somewhere around $808,000.  COLLATERAL, as 
expected, has a positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that loans with collateral are 
less likely to default.   27
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No Obs.  18 
 
df SS  MS  F Significance  F 
1 9,86E+12  9,86+12  291,3741  1,08E-11 
17 5,75E+11  3,38E+10     






























No Obs.  18 
 
df SS  MS  F  Significance  F 
1 9,86E+12  9,86+12  291,3741  1,08E-11 
17 5,75E+11  3,38E+10     
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No Obs.  18 
 
df SS  MS  F  Significance  F 
1 3,23E+13  3,23E+13  224,3489  7,81E-11 
17 2,45E+12  1,44E+11     





















9  0,130969 0,159739
 